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KOCHANSKY v. COMMISSIONER:
THE ASSIGNMENT OF INCOME DOCTRINE,
COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAW, AND I.R.C. § 1041
Sarah Dods
Abstract. In Kochansky v. Commissioner, the Ninth Circuit held that an attorney was fully
taxable on a contingent fee he agreed to split with his spouse at divorce, reasoning that the
assignment of income doctrine requires that income be taxed to the person who earns it. This
Note observes that in applying the assignment doctrine, the Kochansky court erred by failing
to determine the extent of the spouse's community property interest in the contingent fee;
community property income must be taxed one-half to each spouse, regardless of which
spouse earns it, which spouse collects it, and when it is collected. This Note argues, moreover,
that instead of applying any form of the assignment doctrine, the Kochansky court simply
should have applied section 1041 of the Internal Revenue Code, under which each spouse
would have been taxable on his or her share of the proceeds when collected. Many
commentators have advocated such an approach, and the Tax Court has tentatively endorsed it
in other cases.
The assignment of income doctrine requires that income be taxed to
the person who earns it.' This doctrine is a fundamental principle of
taxation. Equally fundamental, however, is the principle that community
property income must be taxed one-half to each spouse.2 Furthermore,
section 1041 of the Internal Revenue Code, which governs transfers of
property between spouses or former spouses incident to divorce, provides
that in such transfers no gain or loss is recognized,3 the property is
treated as if acquired by gift, 4 and the transferee receives the transferor's
basis in the property acquired.5
The issue presented in Kochansky v. Commissioner6 was whether a
contingent fee that two community property taxpayers had agreed to
divide at divorce was taxable entirely to the spouse who earned it when
both spouses eventually collected. The case thus called for an
examination of how the assignment doctrine, community property law,
and section 1041 interact. The Ninth Circuit considered only the
assignment of income doctrine, holding that the fee was taxable entirely
to the spouse who earned it.
1. Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
2. Poe v. Seabom, 282 U.S. 101 (1930).
3. I.LRC. § 1041(a) (1994).
4. I.R.C. § 1041(b)(1).
5. I.RLC. § 1041(b)(2).
6. 92 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 1996), affig 67 T.C.M. (CCH) 2665 (1994).
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This Note observes that, under Ninth Circuit precedent regarding
community property taxation, the Kochansky court incorrectly applied
the assignment doctrine. This Note argues further that given the
provisions and purposes of section 1041, the court should not have
applied the assignment doctrine at all. Part I explains the facts of
Kochansky, the court's analysis, and how other courts have rejected the
assignment doctrine in the divorce context. Part II explains why a correct
application of the assignment doctrine would have required a preliminary
determination of the extent to which the contingent fee was community
property and suggests how such a determination might have proceeded.
Part III describes the operation of section 1041 and summarizes the
Internal Revenue Service's and Tax Court's positions regarding section
1041's interaction with the assignment doctrine. Part IV argues that to
effectuate Congress's purposes in enacting section 1041, to harmonize
section 1041 with other areas of the tax law, and to prevent potential
inequities to community property taxpayers, the assignment doctrine
should not override section 1041. Finally, Part V asserts that section
1041 should have been applied in Kochansky and explahis how such an
approach would have worked.
I. KOCHANSKYv. COMMISSIONER
A. Facts
In September 1983, the McNarys retained Richard Kochansky, an
Idaho attorney, to pursue a medical malpractice claim on a contingent fee
basis.' Mr. Kochansky filed suit on behalf of the: McNarys in
October 1984. In July 1985, Mr. Kochansky and his wife divorced. Their
property settlement provided that each spouse would relinquish his or her
rights to the earnings of the other, except that the net proceeds of any
contingent fee recovered from the McNary lawsuit would be divided
equally!
In late 1987, the McNarys settled their lawsuit.9 The contingent fee
was deposited in Mr. Kochansky's trust account, and after expenses were
paid, a portion of the fee was disbursed to Mr. Kochanskly's former wife
pursuant to their property settlement.'0 Mr. Kochansky reported only the
7. Kochansky v. Commissioner, 67 T.C.M. (CCH) 2665,2666 (1994).
8. Id
9. Id
10. Id. at 2666-67.
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portion of the fee that he ultimately received, and the Commissioner
assessed a deficiency against him for taxes on his former wife's portion"
as well as various additions to tax. 2 Mr. Kochansky contested the
deficiency and additions to tax, but the Tax Court concluded that the
property settlement constituted an assignment of income ineffective to
shift taxation and sustained the deficiency and additions to tax. The
Ninth Circuit affirmed with respect to the deficiency but vacated the Tax
Court's decision on the issue of additions to tax.'3
B. The Ninth Circuit's Analysis
1. Lucas v. Earl and Assignment ofIncome
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the Tax Court that the assignment of
income doctrine required the contingent fee to be taxable entirely to
Mr. Kochansky.' 4 The court relied on the landmark case Lucas v. Earl."5
In Earl, a taxpayer had assigned half of his future income, including
earnings, salaries, fees, and contractual rights, to his wife. The taxpayer
argued that, accordingly, he was taxable only on one half of his income. 6
The U.S. Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding that although it
was valid under state law, the contractual assignment of income was
ineffective to shift taxation.'7 Justice Holmes explained:
There is no doubt that the [income tax] statute could tax salaries to
those who earned them and provide that the tax could not be
escaped by anticipatory arrangements and contracts however
skillfully devised to prevent the salary when paid from vesting even
for a second in the man who earned it. That seems to us the import
of the statute before us and we think that no distinction can be
taken according to the motives leading to the arrangement by which




13. Kochansky v. Commissioner, 92 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 1996).
14. Id at 959.
15. 281 U.S. 111 (1930). The court also relied on Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U.S. 122 (1940)
(holding that insurance agent remained taxable on future renewal commissions he had assigned).
16. Earl, 281 U.S. at 113.
17. Id at 114-15.
18. Id.
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The assignment doctrine that Earl established is undisputedly a first
principle of taxation19 and has long been heralded as necessary to protect
progressivity and to preserve the tax base.20 Courts have developed the
doctrine over the years, often using Holmes's fruit-and-tree metaphor,
2'
in which the "tree" represents income-producing property or a person,
and the "fruit" represents any income the "tree" produces. Essentially,
the doctrine requires that assignment of "fruit" is not effective for tax
purposes without a corresponding transfer of the "tree" -that produced it.
Thus, when income produced by property is assigned, tie assignment is
effective only if an adequate interest in the income-producing property is
also transferred.22 Accrued income, often conceptualized as "ripened
fruit," must be taxed to the transferor.' The line between income from
property and income from personal services is not always clear,24 but for
purposes of the assignment doctrine, an employment contract is not
considered income-producing property. In such circumstances the
employee, not the contract, is considered the "tree" from which the
income grows.5
19. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733, 739-40 (1949). For a thorough
discussion of the doctrine through its formative years, see Charles S. Lyon & James S. Eustice,
Assignment of Income: Fruit and Tree as Irrigated by the P.G. Lake Case, 17 Tax L. Rev. 293
(1962).
20. See Boris I. Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 1389, 1401-03
(1975) (noting Earl's reputation as guardian of progressivity, but criticizng Earl's distinction
between earned and investment income).
21. The metaphor has been an unhelpful one according to some commentators. See, e.g.,
Michael J. Graetz & Deborah H. Schenk, Federal Income Taxation: Principles and Policies 506
(3d ed. 1995) (noting that fruit-and-tree metaphor "has given rise to a whole body of case law that
has attempted to jam the facts into the metaphor").
22. See, e.g., Harrison v. Schaffuer, 312 U.S. 579 (1941) (holding that assignment of trust income
for limited period of time was ineffective because income did not represent interest in trust corpus);
Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940) (holding that gift of interest payments, without gift of
underlying bond, was ineffective); Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5 (1937) (holding that
assignment of trust income for life was effective because income represented irterest in trust corpus).
23. See, e.g., Estate of Smith v. Commissioner, 292 F.2d 478 (3d Cir. 1961) (holding that gift of
stock one day prior to distribution of dividends was ineffective to shift taxation on dividends).
24. See, e.g., Siegel v. United States, 464 F.2d 891, 894 (9th Cir. 1972) (cbserving difficulty of
distinguishing earned income and income from property when taxpayer used ,kill to create income-
producing property, such as copyrighted works).
25. See, e.g., Hall v. United States, 242 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1957) (rejecting taxpayer's argument
that employment contract was income-producing property that effectively could be assigned to wife).
Attempts to assign the "tree" by assigning services in kind are similarly ineffective. See, e.g.,
Vnuk v. Commissioner, 621 F.2d 1318 (8th Cir. 1980) (holding that taxpayers who assigned their
lifetime services to family trust were taxable on their earnings because taxpayers, not trust, retained
control over services); Vercio v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 1246 (1980) (same).
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The "fruit" in Kochansky was the contingent fee, and the court's
analysis suggests several possibilities for the "tree." The court concluded
that regardless of what the "tree" was, the assignment was ineffective. If
the "tree" was the McNarys' claim, the assignment was ineffective
because Mr. Kochansky did not own the claim and therefore could not
have assigned it.26 If the "tree" was Mr. Kochansky's law practice, the
assignment was ineffective because Mr. Kochansky did not transfer any
part of his law practice." Stressing that the contingent fee was
compensation for personal services, however, the court concluded that
"[i]n terms of the tree-fruit analogy, 'there was no tree other than [the
taxpayer] himself."'28 Accordingly, because Mr. Kochansky did not
transfer himself, his assignment of part of the contingent fee was held
ineffective to shift taxation.29
2. Assignments of Uncertain or Contingent Income
Nonetheless, Mr. Kochansky argued that the assignment was effective
on the principle that when an income right is uncertain, doubtful, or
contingent, assignment of that right will be effective to shift taxation.30
When this principle is applied to an assignment of an interest in a legal
claim or contingent fee, the assignment's effectiveness generally turns on
the level of uncertainty at the time of transfer, whether consideration is
exchanged, and whether the assignment is between family members.3'
These factors were significant to the court's analysis in Jones v.
Commissioner,32 the case upon which Mr. Kochansky primarily relied.
In Jones, a taxpayer assigned his legal claim in exchange for $10,000
and the assignee's promise to bear the risks and expense of pursuing the
claim.33 The Jones court held that the assignment was effective.34 The
26. Kochansky v. Commissioner, 92 F.3d 957,959 (9th Cir. 1996).
27. Id.
28. Id. (quoting Hall v. United States, 242 F.2d 412,413 (7th Cir. 1957)).
29. Id.
30. Ra at 958 (citing Jones v. Commissioner, 306 F.2d 292, 301 (5th Cir. 1962)); Cold Metal
Process Co. v. Commissioner, 247 F.2d 864, 872-73 (6th Cir. 1957); Dodge v. United States, 443
F. Supp. 535, 538 (D. Or. 1977)); see also Commissioner v. Timken, 141 F.2d 625 (6th Cir. 1944)
(holding that assignment was effective when debtor was in default at time of assignment);
Wellhouse v. Tomlinson, 197 F. Supp. 739 (S.D. Fla. 1961) (holding that assignment was effective
when debtor's legal obligation to pay was questionable at time of assignment).
31. See, e.g., Doyle v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 769 (4th Cir. 1945) (holding that gratuitous, intra-
family assignment of claim proceeds, made when recovery was practically assured, was ineffective).
32. 306 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1962).
33. Id. at 294.
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court based its holding on several factors it had culled from the major
assignment of income cases: the extent to which control of the claim
passed to the assignee; whether the transfer was gratuitous or for
valuable consideration; how soon the assignment occurred before
collection of the income; whether the assignment was at arm's length or
between family members; whether there was a legitimate non-tax-
avoidance purpose for the assignment; and to what extent the prospect of
recovery was uncertain at the time of the assignment." The Ninth Circuit
did not adopt these factors in Kochansky because it distinguished Jones
on its facts.36 In Jones, the taxpayer transferred his own claim along with
his entire business and relinquished control over both upon assignment.
In Kochansky, however, the taxpayer did not own the claim and did not
relinquish any control over it upon assignment.
Nevertheless, examination of the Jones factors might have drawn the
Kochansky court's attention to some of the reasons why assignment
principles are less appropriate in the context of divorce than in other
circumstances. Because the parties are parting, for example, the assignor
at divorce does not stand to retain control over income as does the
assignor in a traditional intra-family assignment. The U.S. Supreme
Court has concluded that for tax purposes, divorcing spouses may be said
to act at arm's length," and that when property is transferred at divorce
for a relinquishment of marital rights, the exchange is not gratuitous but
is made for valuable consideration." When consideration is exchanged
for an income right in an arm's length transaction, however, the assignor
is taxed on the consideration received, and the assignee is taxed on the
income collected that exceeds his or her cost.39 Had this principle been
applied in Kochansky, Mr. Kochansky would have been taxable at
divorce on the consideration he received for assigning part of the
contingent fee,4" precisely the approach to divorce taxation that Congress
34. Id. at 301.
35. Id. at 301-02 (citations omitted).
36. Kochansky v. Commissioner, 92 F.3d 957, 959 (9th Cir. 1996).
37. United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65, 72 (1962).
38. Id. at 69 n.6.
39. See, e.g., Cotlow v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 1019 (1954), aff'd, 228 F.2d 186 (2d Cir. 1955);
see also Schulze v. Commissioner, 46 T.C.M. (CCHI) 143, 146 (1983) (approving principle in
context of divorce); Wilkinson v. United States, 304 F.2d 469, 472 (CL CI. 1962) (approving
principle in context of partial sale of contingent fee). The principle is inapplicable if the true nature
of the transaction is a loan. Compare Mapco Inc. v. United States, 556 F.2d 1107 (Ct. CI. 1977)
(assignment recast as loan) with Estate of Stranahan, 472 F.2d 867 (6th Cir. 1973) (assignment not
recast as loan).
40. See infra note 112.
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rejected in enacting, and the Tax Court has rejected in interpreting,
section 1041."
Finally, assignment of an income right at divorce can serve a
legitimate purpose unrelated to tax avoidance: to effectuate an equitable
division of the couple's property. In cases involving taxpayers not
subject to section 1041, other courts have rejected the assignment
doctrine in the divorce context for this reason. In Kenfield v. United
States,42 for example, the Tenth Circuit held that a partner in a real estate
partnership was not taxable on future partnership earnings that were
assigned to his wife at divorce, even though he retained full control over
the partnership interest, with the former wife's only participation being
receipt of the income.43 Stressing that a divorce settlement constitutes a
division of co-owned property and is not a voluntary transfer susceptible
of manipulation for tax avoidance purposes, the court concluded that the
assignment doctrine was inapplicable.' Similarly, in Schulze v.
Commissioner," the Tax Court considered a couple who agreed in
connection with their divorce to share the proceeds of the husband's
pending legal claim.46 The Tax Court relied on the factors set forth in
Jones to hold that the husband was not taxable on the proceeds disbursed
to his former wife, stressing that the assignment was not gratuitous and
was made for the legitimate purpose of effectuating an equal division of
property at divorce.a
Thus, in both Kenfield and Schulze, the assignment doctrine was not
applied even though the assignee spouse was given little or no control
over the income right that was assigned, and at least part of the income
assigned was earned by the assignor .4 The assignments were given effect
because they were not gratuitous, were not wholly voluntary, and were
made for the purpose of equitably dividing marital property. In
41. See infra text accompanying notes 99-101.
42. 783 F.2d 966 (10th Cir. 1986).
43. Id. at 967. Although the settlement's language literally assigned earnings, the court reasoned
that it must have operated to divide the partnership interest as marital property and therefore must
have granted the former wife a partnership interest. IM. at 967-69. The court dismissed Treasury
regulations governing the degree of control necessary for partnership status as a mere "response to
the evasionary assignment-of-income transfers... taxpayers have attempted over the years." Id at
970.
44. Id. at970.
45. 46 T.C.M. (CCH) 143 (1983).
46. Id at 144.
47. IM. at 146.
48. Il at 144; Kenfield, 783 F.2d at 967.
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Kochansky, the taxpayer attempted to make a similar argument based on
Idaho's community property law.49 Perhaps mindful of the complications
that applying community property principles in KocharsIky would have
entailed, the Ninth Circuit refused to consider this argument."
II. TAXATION OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY INTERESTS IN
CONTINGENT FEES
A. Taxation of Community Income
Applying community property principles in Kochansky would have
entailed significant complications under long-established rules governing
community property taxation. Although the Ninth Circuit stated that the
"ancient precedent" of Lucas v. Earl5" controlled Kochansky,52 a
similarly ancient precedent controls Earl's application to the taxation of
community property income. In Poe v. Seaborn53 and its companion
cases,' the U.S. Supreme Court held that community property spouses
49. Kochansky v. Commissioner, 92 F.3d 957, 959 (9th Cir. 1996); Appellant's Brief at 6-10
(No. 94-70747). Kochansky's community property argument differs from the analysis in this Note.
Kochansky argued that the right to the contingent fee was community property owned equally by
each spouse at divorce, and when divided at divorce, the right to one half of the fee became the
separate property of each, and accordingly, each spouse was taxable on the income generated by that
separate property after divorce. The Ninth Circuit rejected similar reasoning in Johnson v. United
States, 135 F.2d 125, 127-28 (9th Cir. 1943). Had the Kochansky court found that each spouse's
community interest was equivalent to one half of the net contingent fee, no a3signment would have
occurred, and each would have been taxable on the half collected. Although such a finding would
have simplified the case, it would not have reflected Idaho law, under which ie community had no
interest in the fee to the extent it was earned after divorce, even though a contigent contractual right
to the fee was acquired during marriage. See Shill v. Shill, 765 P.2d 140, 143 (Idaho 1988) [Shill 17]
(holding that increase in value of contingent pension plan attributable to post.divorce labor was not
community property).
50. Kochansky, 92 F.3d at 959.
51. 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
52. Kochansky, 92 F.3d at 958.
53. 282 U.S. 101 (1930) (applying Washington's community property law). Seaborn was decided
only eight months after Earl and profoundly shaped our tax system by spurring enactment of the
joint return. See generally 3 Mertens Law of Federal Income Taxation § 19.02 (1988) (describing
state reactions to Seaborn, unsuccessful Congressional proposals for overriling it, and eventual
enactment of joint return in 1948). For an overview of tax issues related to various states'
community property systems, see Fred F. Murray, Problems of Taxation of the Income of Spouses in
the Context ofDivorce and Separation, Community Prop. J., July 1987, at 20.
54. Soon after Seaborn, the U.S. Supreme Court held that other states' community property laws
yielded the same income tax consequences. See United States v. Malcolm, 282 U.S. 792 (1931)
(California); Bender v. Pfaff, 282 U.S. 127 (1930) (Louisiana); Hopkins v. Bacon, 282 U.S. 122
(1930) (Texas); Goodell v. Koch, 282 U.S. 118 (1930) (Arizona). The Service recognized Idaho, as
well as Nevada and New Mexico, as community property states for tax purposes in 1930.
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are each taxable on half of the couple's aggregate community income,
regardless of which spouse actually labored to produce the income. The
Seaborn Court distinguished Earl in that Mr. Earl's earnings would have
been his own property absent the contractual arrangement with his wife.5
In Seaborn, on the other hand, community property law mandated that
the husband's earnings were the property of the community, not the
husband, even though the husband had labored to earn them. 6 Later, the
Court applied Seaborn's reasoning to confirm that a taxpayer's
community property tax liability on his or her former spouse's earnings
during marriage was not absolved by divorce."
Not long after Seaborn, the Ninth Circuit considered Seaborn's
relationship to the assignment of income doctrine when a taxpayer
assigns community property income rights to her husband at divorce. In
Johnson v. United States,"8 a wife agreed in a divorce settlement to
assign her community property interest in legal fees owed to her attorney
husband by certain clients. Under Seaborn, the wife possessed a vested
property right in the husband's earnings for tax purposes,59 and she
would have been subject to tax on half the fees had no assignment
occurred. Furthermore, under the assignment of income cases, a taxpayer
could not shift tax liability by assigning an income right to another
taxpayer.6 Applying these principles, the Johnson court concluded that
the wife's relinquishment of her community property rights in the fees
through the divorce settlement constituted an assignment of income of
the kind contemplated by the assignment of income cases.6 Therefore,
the court held that the wife remained taxable on half of the fees. 62
Mim. 3853, X-1 C.B. 139 (1930). See generally 3 Boris L Bittker & Lawrence Lokken, Federal
Taxation of Income, Estates, and Gifts 76.1 (2d ed. 1991).
55. Seaborn, 282 U.S. at 117.
56. Id.
57. United States v. Mitchell, 403 U.S. 190 (1971). Legislation enacted to afford relief to such
spouses only applies in limited circumstances. See LRC. § 66 (1994); Bittker & Lokken, supra
note 54, at 76.4.
58. 135 F.2d 125 (9th Cir. 1943).
59. Id. at 129 (citing Seaborn, 282 U.S. at 111).
60. Id. at 128 (citing Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U.S. 579 (1941); Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U.S.
122 (1940); Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940)).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 130. The result in Johnson was not so inequitable as it may appear, because the husband
had agreed to pay his wife's tax liability for the years in which she was taxable on the fees. Id. at
127. However, Johnson's potentially harsh impact is apparent: the greater the community interest in
uncollected community income one spouse relinquishes at divorce, the larger his or her eventual tax
liability grows.
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Accordingly, Johnson mandates that when community property
taxpayers divorce in the Ninth Circuit, a spouse's assignment of a
community income right will not shift tax liability on that income right,
regardless of who earned the income and who ultimately collects it.
B. Community Property Interests in Contingent Fees
The Kochansky court's application of the assignment doctrine without
regard to community property rights in the contingent fee is inconsistent
with Johnson, because to the extent that Ms. Kochansky possessed a
community property interest in the fee proceeds she received, no
assignment of income occurred. Accordingly, if the assignment doctrine
was to be applied at all, Kochansky required a preliminary determination
of whether, and to what extent, the contingent fee was community
property.
The Ninth Circuit refused to consider community property law in
Kochansky on the grounds that the issue was first raised. on appeal and
that facts had not been developed to support the existence of a
community interest in the fee.' The fundamental principle of community
property law in Idaho as elsewhere, however, is that each spouse
possesses an undivided one-half interest in income earned by his or her
spouse during marriage.6' Determining the value of the community
interest in the fee may have required additional factuel findings,' but
determining the existence of any community interest in the fee was
purely a matter of Idaho law.67
63. Kochansky v. Commissioner, 92 F.3d 957, 959 (9th Cir. 1996). The court cited United
States v. Kimball, 896 F.2d 1218 (9th Cir. 1990), vacated in part on reh 'g, 925 F.2d 356 (1991), to
support its refusal to consider the community property issue. However, Kimball presents three
exceptions to the general rule against considering issues first raised on appeal, one of which is when
review of the issue is necessary to preserve the integrity of the judicial process. Id. at 1219. In
Kochansky, community property analysis was necessary to preserve the irtegrity of the judicial
process, because such analysis was necessary to reconcile Kochansky wi'h the Ninth Circuit's
precedent in Johnson v. United States, 135 F.2d 125 (9th Cir. 1943).
64. Kochansky, 92 F.3d at 959.
65. See, e.g., Idaho Code § 32-906 (1983 & Supp. 1995); Poe v. Seaborn. 282 U.S. 101 (1930);
see generally William Q. de Funiak & Michael J. Vaughn, Principles of Community Property § I
(2d ed. 1971).
66. See infra text accompanying notes 77-78.
67. Accordingly, the issue of whether a community property interest existed also fell within
another of Kimball's exceptions to the general rule against reviewing issues first raised on appeal.
See Kimball, 896 F.2d at 1219. This question could have been decided according to Idaho precedent
or certified to the Idaho Supreme Court. See Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967);
Idaho App. R. 12.1(a).
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The Supreme Court of Idaho has upheld a decision that an attorney's
hourly fees earned during marriage were community property," but it has
not specifically considered whether and to what extent contingent fees
earned partially during marriage and partially after divorce are
community property. Two Idaho Supreme Court decisions indicate,
however, that such fees would be characterized as community property
to the extent they were earned during marriage. In Shill 169 and Shill 117
the Idaho Supreme Court considered whether and to what extent spouses
possess a community property interest in a contingent, non-vested
pension plan earned by one spouse during marriage, but collected after
divorce. Shill I established that a contingent, non-vested pension earned
by one spouse is community property divisible at divorce." The primary
holding in Shill I was not that such an interest existed, but that when
dividing such a plan at divorce, courts should look not to cash-surrender
value, but to the present worth of future payments, taking all the various
contingencies affecting value into account.72 Shill HI established that,
although proper valuation must take contingencies into account, any
increase in the pension's value attributable to the earning spouse's labor
after divorce is not considered community property.73
Like the contingent, non-vested pension plan in Shill I, the fee in
Kochansky represented a contingent, non-vested right to future income
attributable in part to labor performed during marriage and in part to
labor performed after divorce. As in Shill I, events only partly within the
employee spouse's control influenced whether, when, and how much
income was ultimately collected.74
68. Smith v. Smith, 860 P.2d 634, 643 (Idaho 1993). The Smith court also upheld the trial court's
valuation of the attorney's accounts receivable, implying that the accounts receivable were also
community property. Id. at 640.
69. Shill v. Shill, 599 P.2d 1004 (Idaho 1979) [Shill1].
70. Shill v. Shill, 765 P.2d 140 (Idaho 1988) [Shill11].
71. Shill 1, 599 P.2d at 1007. ShillI accords with the law of other community property states. See,
e.g., Van Loan v. Van Loan, 569 P.2d 214 (Ariz. 1977); Brown v. Brown, 544 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1976);
LeClert v. LeClert, 453 P.2d 755 (N.M. 1969); Cearley v. Cearley, 544 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1976);
Wilder v. Wilder, 85 Wash. 2d 364,534 P.2d 1355 (1975).
72. Shill I, 599 P.2d at 1007-08. The Shill I court observed that a court may award a lump sum
according to the pension's present value or may reserve jurisdiction to divide the pension if and
when it becomes due. Id. at 1008, 1010.
73. Shill II, 765 P.2d at 148.
74. For example, in Shill I the employee spouse could have died, changed jobs, or been
discharged before the pension vested, and he could have influenced the amount and timing of the
payments by continuing to work after the date of first vesting. Shill!, 599 P.2d at 1008.
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Applying the Idaho court's reasoning in Shill I and Shill II to
Kochansky yields the conclusion that a community property interest in
the contingent fee existed at the time of divorce, but the extent of this
interest was limited to the proportion of the fee that was earned during
marriage. All community property states that have considered the issue
have adopted this approach,75 and at least one court has specifically
relied on the analogy to contingent, non-vested pensions in reaching this
conclusion.76 The courts generally have reasoned that a contractual right,
although contingent on future events, is property divisible at divorce, and
that the extent of the community's interest in this property is
ascertainable by reference to the percentage of hours the attorney spouse
worked on the claim during marriage.
Valuation under this approach usually requires reserving jurisdiction
until the contingent fee is collected or the case closed, because the ratio
of the community interest to the non-community interest cannot be
ascertained until that time. To determine the extent of the community's
interest, the total fee collected is multiplied by the ratio of hours the
spouse worked on the claim during marriage to the total hours the spouse
worked on the claim, with possible weight given to other relevant factors
and appropriate offsets for costs.77 Thus, determining the community
property interest in the contingent fee in Kochansky would have required
75. See Garrett v. Garrett, 683 P.2d 1166 (Ariz. App. 1983); In re Kilboume, 232 Cal. App. 3d
1518 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (partially published decision); Waters v. Waters, 170 P.2d 494 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1946); Due v. Due, 342 So. 2d 161 (La. 1977); In re Marriage of Estes, 84 Wash. App. 586,
929 P.2d 500 (1997); Weiss v. Weiss, 365 N.W.2d 608, 613 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985); cf
Commissioner v. King, 69 F.2d 639 (5th Cir. 1934) (holding that contingent fee collected after
wife's death was community property under Texas law and taxable as such); Buck v. Rogers, 709
S.W.2d 283 (Tex. App. 1986) (holding that attorney spouse's fraudulent failure to disclose
community property interests in contingent fees at divorce entitled former spouse to one half of
proceeds under terms of property settlement). But cf Harris v. Harris, 765 S.W.2d 798 (Tex. App.
1989) (holding that contingent fee contract owned by law partnership was not susceptible to
characterization as community or separate property, although spouse's partnership interest could be
characterized as community property). See generally Kenneth L. Hickman, The Classification of
Contingent Fee Contracts as Community or Separate Property, 37 La. 1',. Rev. 1190 (1977)
(discussing classification and division of contingent fee contracts as community property under
Louisiana's Civil Code).
Non-community property states have reached mixed results, but a number have concluded that
contingent fees are marital property to the extent earned during marriage. Compare In re Marriage of
Vogt, 773 P.2d 631 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989), Lyons v. Lyons, 526 N.E.2d 1063 (Mass. 1988), and
Metzner v. Metzner, 446 S.E.2d 165 (W. Va. 1994), with Goldstein v. Goldstein, 414 S.E.2d 474
(Ga. 1992), In re Marriage of Zells, 572 N.E.2d 944 (Ill. 1991), In re Marriage of Tietz, 605 N.E.2d
670 (ll. App. Ct. 1992), Musser v. Musser, 909 P.2d 37 (Okla. 1995), and Beasley v. Beasley, 518
A.2d 545 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986).
76. Garrett, 683 P.2d at 1169.
77. Id. at 1172-73.
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factual findings concerning the number of hours Mr. Kochansky spent on
the McNary lawsuit while married, the number of hours he spent on it
overall, and possibly the nature and quality of his work at various stages
of representation.78 Such a determination was necessary in Kochansky,
even though the spouses had long since agreed how they would actually
divide the fee, if the assignment doctrine was to be applied in a manner
consistent with Johnson.79 This fact-intensive calculation would have
been unnecessary, however, had the Kochansky court simply applied
section 1041.
I. SECTION 1041 AND THE ASSIGNMENT OF INCOME
DOCTRINE
A. The Operation of Section 1041
Section 1041 governs all transfers of property between spouses, and
between former spouses if the transfer is incident to divorce." Section
1041 provides that the transferor will recognize no gain or loss at
transfer, that the property transferred will be treated as if acquired by the
transferee by gift, and that the transferee will take the transferor's basis
in the property received.8' The Treasury Regulations emphasize that the
carryover basis rule applies "[i]n all cases."82
Gift treatment entails the application of section 102, under which a
cash payment from one spouse to the other is simply non-taxable.83
When property other than cash is transferred, the transferee is similarly
not taxable on the property when it is received, but is taxable on income
78. Another approach would be to value the community's interest by equating it with the
reasonable value of the services rendered during marriage, but this valuation may bear little or no
relation to the fee recovered, especially in cases where no fee is recovered. Valuing the contingent
fee by this method would probably be impermissible because it is analogous to valuing a pension by
reference to its cash surrender value at divorce, a method the Idaho court rejected in Shill L See
supra note 72.
79. The Garrett court observed that taxation of the fee would be governed by Johnson v. United
States, 135 F.2d 125 (9th Cir. 1943), under which each spouse would be taxable on his or her
community property share of the fee upon collection. Garrett, 683 P.2d at 1171.
80. Neither opinion and none of the parties' appellate briefs mention § 1041, but the section is
mandatory and applies to all transfers pursuant to property settlements executed after July 18, 1984.
Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1041-lT)(0 (1984).
81. I.R.C. § 1041 (1994).
82. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1041-1T(d)A-11. Basis is adjusted, however, to the extent that
liabilities exceed basis when property is transferred in trust I.R.C. § 1041(e).
83. I.R.C. § 102(a) (1994). If the cash payment is alimony, it is taxable to the payee and
deductible by the payor unless the spouses designate otherwise. See LR.C. §§'71, 215 (1994).
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generated by the property' and on any gain realized when the property is
later sold or exchanged. Gain or loss at this time is determined by
reference to the basis carried over from the transferor at the time of
transfer." When a transferee spouse receives an interest in an item of
uncollected income rather than the cash equivalent of that interest,
section 1041 should therefore operate to treat the interest as if acquired
by gift, and the transferee should take the transferor's basis in that
interest. Accordingly, the transferee should be taxable by reference to
this basis when the property is later exchanged for cash or other property.
When the deferred income item has a zero basis, the transferee should be
fully taxable when he or she collects. Section 1041's conflict with the
assignment of income doctrine in such circumstances is apparent, but the
conflict has not been resolved by the Service or the courts.
B. The Service's Position
The Service has taken inconsistent positions concerning section
1041's conflict with the assignment of income doctrine. It first
considered the issue in a 1987 Revenue Ruling concerning a transfer of
U.S. savings bonds pursuant to a divorce settlement. 6 The Service held
that the deferred interest that had accrued on the bonds was taxable to the
transferor, with the simple explanation that recognition of accrued
income in such circumstances will simply be treated as a matter distinct
from recognition of gain.87 The ruling did not examine the purposes
behind section 1041 or how the assignment doctrine interacts with other
nonrecognition provisions.88
The Service also has taken various positions on the issue in private
letter rulings89 concerning deferred compensation." For example, in a
84. I.R. § 102(b)(1).
85. LR.C. § 1041(b)(2).
86. Rev. Rul. 87-112, 1987-2 C.B. 208. But cf Cofield v. Koehler, 207 F. Supp. 73 (D. Kan.
1962) (declining to tax husband on accrued interest on savings bonds transferred at divorce because
transfer effectuated partition ofjointly owned property).
87. Rev. Rul. 87-112. In determining that the basis of the bonds in the transferee's hands would
be adjusted to reflect the gain recognized by the transferor, the Service analogized the transfer to a
gift of an installment obligation. The analogy is inopportune, however, given the operation of
§ 453B(g), which excludes inter-spousal transfers of installment obligations from the usual tax
treatment of gifts or other dispositions of installment obligations. See infra text accompanying notes
129-30.
88. See infra text accompanying note 141.
89. The Service does not consider itself bound by private letter rulings in dalings with taxpayers
other than the party to whom issued. I.RC. § 61100)(3) (1994). Nevertheless, the U.S. Supreme
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ruling later reversed by the Tax Court, the Service concluded that when a
taxpayer exchanged community property rights to her former husband's
future retirement income for cash, the cash was immediately taxable to
her.9 Observing that taxation follows community property rights under
Seaborn and Johnson, the Service characterized her exchange of rights
for cash as an assignment in which she was taxable on the consideration
received.92 In at least two other rulings, the Service has declined to
express an opinion on the issue.93
Other rulings indicate a different approach. In one ruling, the Service
took the position that where cash payments were exchanged for
community property rights to unspecified business "benefits," the
payments were non-taxable to the transferee.' The Service implied that,
had the spouses simply agreed that the non-earner spouse would retain an
ownership interest in half of the benefits rather than taking a cash
equivalent at divorce, each spouse would have been taxable as he or she
collected.95 The Service endorsed a similar position in a technical advice
memorandum concerning a stock redemption at divorce.96 In that
situation, the husband transferred stock in the family corporation to his
wife at divorce, and the corporation immediately redeemed the stock
pursuant to the divorce decree. But for section 1041, the husband would
have been treated as having redeemed the stock himself and would have
Court has cited private letter rulings as evidence of inconsistent interpretation by the Service. See,
e.g., Rowan Cos. v. United States, 452 U.S. 247,261 n.17 (1981).
90. The Service's position on transfers of RAs illustrates such inconsistency. Compare Priv. Ltr.
Rul. 94-22-060 (Mar. 14, 1994) (ruling that transfer of IRA between spouses was taxable
notwithstanding § 1041), and Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88-20-086 (Feb. 25, 1988) (same) with Priv. Ltr. Rul.
89-29-046 (Apr. 25, 1989) (ruling that transfer of interests in spouses' IRAs was non-taxable under
§ 1041 as informed by legislative intent). See generally Deborah A. Geier, Form, Substance, and
Section 1041, 60 Tax Notes 519 (July 26, 1993).
91. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88-13-023 (Dec. 29, 1987), rev'd, Balding v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 368
(1992); see infra text accompanying notes 99-102.
92. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88-13-023 (citing Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930); Johnson v. United
States, 135 F.2d 125 (9th Cir. 1943); Veit v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 809 (1947)).
93. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-15-026 (Jan. 2, 1996); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88-42-072 (July 29, 1988).
94. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-23-053 (Mar. 13, 1991).
95. Id. The Service stated:
The instrument executed in Year B did not give Wife title to one-half of Husband's Benefits in
Business [B]. Rather, in consideration for Wife's community property interest, the instrument
required Husband to pay Wife the cash equivalent of one-half of the benefits. Accordingly, the
payments are transfers of property between an individual and a former spouse, incident to
divorce, and are non-taxable under § 1041 of the Code.
Id
96. Tech. Adv. Mem. 90-46-004 (July 20, 1990).
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been taxable on the proceeds. The Service taxed the wife, however,
reasoning that in enacting section 1041:
Congress gave taxpayers a mechanism for determining: which of the
two spouses will pay the tax upon the ultimate disposition of the
asset. The spouses are thus free to negotiate between themselves
whether the "owner" spouse will first sell the asset, recognize the
gain or loss, and then transfer to the transferee spouse the proceeds
from that sale, or whether the owner spouse will first transfer the
asset to the transferee spouse who will then recognize gain or loss
upon its subsequent sale.97
The Service's approach in these situations suggests that spouses
considering the division of an income item at divorce should be free to
determine the tax consequences of their settlement by the form of
transaction they choose.
C. The Tax Court's Position
The Tax Court has tentatively rejected the assignment doctrine in the
context of divorce, reasoning that applying the doctrine thwarts
Congress's purposes in enacting section 1041. The Tax Court first
considered the issue when it reviewed the Service's attempt to tax an
assignor spouse on consideration received in exchange for community
property income rights.9" The Tax Court reversed this Service ruling in
Balding v. Commissioner." The Balding court agreed. that a former
wife's relinquishment of community property rights to her husband's
future retirement pay constituted an assignment of income, observing
that outside the marital context, it would have little trouble taxing her on
the consideration she received."° The court concluded, however, that the
legislative purposes behind section 1041 rendered this aspect of the
assignment of income doctrine inapplicable and, accordingly, refused to
tax the wife on this consideration.1"' The court declined to decide
whether, as Johnson requires, she would be taxable on her community
97. Id. This concept of "private ordering" characterizes the Code's treatment of alimony under
§§ 71 and 215, which allow spouses to designate whether support payments will be deductible to
payor and taxable to payee, or non-deductible to payor and non-taxable to payee.
98. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88-13-023 (Dec. 29, 1987). See supra text accompanying notes 91-92.
99. 98 T.C. 368 (1992).
100. Id. at 370 (citing Commissioner v. P.G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260 (1958)).
101. Id at373.
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property portion of the retirement pay when her former husband
eventually collected it.' 2
The Tax Court again considered the interaction of the assignment
doctrine with section 1041 in Berger v. Commissioner.°3 In Berger, a
husband transferred his interest in a family business, including certain
sales contracts and receivables, to his wife at divorce. The husband
argued that no part of the income accrued at the point of transfer was
taxable to him. The court noted that subjecting section 1041 to the
assignment doctrine had been sharply criticized on the grounds that this
position can cause misattribution of income and uncertainty in marital
property negotiations." 4 In Berger, however, the husband had actually
received economic benefits from the accrued income, in the form of draw
payments and payments of expenses, prior to transfer.' Thus, the court
concluded that misattribution of income was not a concern and taxed a
certain amount of the accrued income to the husband."° The court did
not hold, however, that the assignment doctrine overrides section 1041.
Instead, the court held that in the peculiar factual circumstances of this
case, section 1041 did not trump the clear reflection of income rule.'l 7
Berger suggests that the Tax Court considers uncertainty and
misattribution of income legitimate reasons not to apply the assignment
doctrine to section 1041, and that instead, the Tax Court will apply other,
more flexible tax rules to reach fair results in appropriate circumstances.
102. 111 at 373 n.8. The court stated:
We do not here deal with the tax consequences to petitioner of retirement payments made by the
Government on account of Balding's retirement Cf Johnson v. United States, 135 F.2d 125 (9th
Cir. 1943). Accordingly, we have no occasion to consider whether the assignment of income
doctrine would require petitioner's share of those retirement payments to be taken into
petitioner's income as paid by the Government to Balding, notwithstanding petitioner's lack of
entitlement to such payments.
Rd.




107. Id. at 2177. This rule requires that a taxpayer's method of accounting clearly reflect income.
The Service is given broad discretion under I.&C. § 446 (1994) in determining whether a taxpayer's
method of accounting clearly reflects income and if not, what accounting method is required to
do so. See generally 2 Mertens Law ofFederal Income Taxation § 12.15-18 (1990).
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IV. THE ASSIGNMENT DOCTRINE SHOULD NOT OVERRIDE
SECTION 1041
A. Legislative Purposes of Section 1041
Many tax scholars and practitioners have noted the uncertain
relationship between the assignment doctrine and section 1041, and they
have nearly unanimously concluded that the doctrine should not override
section 1041.108 Their primary objection has been that subjecting section
1041 to the doctrine undermines Congress's express purposes in enacting
section 1041. Section 1041 was enacted as part of the Deficit Reduction
Act of 1984'" with the express purpose of overturning the prior rules of
divorce taxation'.. established by United States v. Davis.II Under Davis,
transfers of appreciated property to a spouse or former spouse in
exchange for the relinquishment of marital rights triggered immediate
gain recognition to the transferor."' The transferee reported no income or
108. See, e.g., Carlyn S. McCaffrey & Melissa G. Salten, Structuring the Tax Consequences of
Marriage and Divorce § 604 (Little, Brown Tax Practice Series 1995) (criticizing application of
doctrine); Michael Asimow, The Assault on Tax-Free Divorce: Carryover Bmais and Assignment of
Income, 44 Tax L. Rev. 65, 84-112 (1988) (arguing comprehensively against application of
doctrine); Geier, supra note 90 (arguing against application of doctrine; stressing spouses' freedom
to determine tax consequences through form of transfer); Roland L. Hjorth, Divorce, Taxes, and the
1984 Tax Reform Act: An Inadequate Response to an Old Problem, 61 Wash. L. Rev. 151, 165-66 &
n.68 (1986) (describing argument for inapplicability; suggesting use of tax indemnification
agreements); Michael J.R. Hoffman & Kenneth N. Orbach, Assignment ofIncome and Divorce, 23
Tax Adviser 601 (1992) (arguing against application of assignment doctriie); John A. Miller,
Federal Income Taxation and Community Property Law: The Case For Divorce, 44 Sw. L.J. 1087,
1121-30 (1990) (noting inequities of applying doctrine in community proper., context); Walter H.
Nunnallee, The Assignment of Income Doctrine as Applied to Section 1041 Divorce Transfers: How
the Service Got It Wrong, 68 Or. L. Rev. 615 (1989) (arguing comprehensively against application of
doctrine); Gary C. Randall, Transfers to Spouses or Incident to Divorce: Section 1041 and Planning
Considerations, Q 165 A.L.I.-A.B.A. Video L. Rev. Study Materials 61, 66-67 (1988) (noting
community property issues); Nancy J. Brown, Comment, Domestic Relations Tax Reform, 20 Gonz.
L. Rev. 251, 261-62 (1984/85) (noting community property issues; arguing doctrine inapplicable);
Warren P. Kean, Note, Federal Income Tax Consequences of Dissolving the Marital Community
Upon Divorce, 44 La. L. Rev. 1823, 1829 n.43 (1984) (predicting doctrine wold not apply; noting
community property issues; suggesting private tax agreements). But cf Leon Gabinet, Section 1041:
The High Price of Quick Fix Reform in Taxation of Interspousal Transfers, 5 Am. J. Tax Pol'y 13,
21-26 (1986) (suggesting situation of potential abuse; noting differences from other nonrecognition
contexts).
109. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 421, 98 Stat. 793 (1984) (codified as
amended at26 U.S.C. § 1041 (1994)).
110. H.R. Rep. No. 98-432, pt. 2, at 1491-93 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 697, 1134.
111. 370 U.S. 65 (1962).
112. Id at 74. The transferor's gain was measured by the difference between the transferor's basis
and the value of the property the transferor acquired. If this "property" consisted of a relinquishment
of the other spouse's marital rights, these rights were presumed equal in value to the fair market
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gain on the transaction.. and took a basis in the transferred property
equal to its fair market value at the time of transfer." 4 These rules did not
apply to approximately equal divisions of community property," 5 to
divisions of jointly-held property," 6 and in some common law states, to
equitable divisions of marital property." 7 Thus, the taxation of property
divisions at divorce was often unclear, varied significantly from state to
state, and resulted in considerable controversy and litigation."' Davis
often caused a harsh and unexpected tax burden because divorcing
spouses either were unaware of the Davis rule or mistakenly believed
that their property was jointly owned." 9 Davis was particularly
unpopular because a divorce transfer not only generated no cash with
which to pay the tax liability, but, in effect, depleted the transferor's net
wealth. 2 Finally, Davis struck when spouses were already suffering
emotional and financial strain. Davis probably "whipsawed" the
government, because although much Davis gain went unreported by
transferors, transferees would use the property's fair market value at
transfer to compute gain upon a later sale of the property.'
Congress enacted section 1041 to correct these problems,122 and the
Treasury supported Congress's decision.'2 In overturning the Davis rule,
value of the property the transferor transferred, under the principle established in Philadelphia Park
Amusement Co. v. United States, 126 F. Supp. 184, 189 (Ct Cl. 1954). Davis, 370 U.S. at 72.
113. See Davis, 370 U.S. at 73 n.7.
114. Under the principle of Philadelphia Park Amusement Co., the transferee's basis in the
property received was determined by equating the value of his or her marital rights with the fair
market value of the property he or she received. Id. at 73; see also supra note 112.
115. Community property settlements were taxable, however, to the extent that separate property
was exchanged. See Carrieres v. Commissioner, 552 F.2d 1350 (9th Cir. 1977).
116. See Rev. Rul. 74-347, 1974-2 C.B. 26; Rev. Rul. 81-292, 1981-2 C.B. 158.
117. Compare, e.g., Imel v. United States, 523 F.2d 853 (10th Cir. 1975) (holding Colorado
equitable distribution statute created species of common ownership such that division was non-
taxable) with Wiles v. Commissioner, 499 F.2d 255 (10th Cir. 1974) (holding Kansas equitable
distribution statute did not create species of common ownership; division taxable).
118. HRL Rep. No. 98-432, pt. 2, at 1491 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 697, 1134
(citing Bosch v. United States, 590 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1979); Imel, 523 F.2d 853; Wiles, 499 F.2d
255; Wallace v. United States, 439 F.2d 757 (8th Cir. 1971); Collins v. Commissioner, 412 F.2d 211
(10th Cir. 1969); McKinney v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 263 (1975)).
119. H.IL Rep. No. 98-432, at 1491.
120. See Laurie L. Malman, Unfinished Reform: The Tax Consequences of Divorce, 61 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 363,387 n.1 18 (1986).
121. H.R. Rep. No. 98-432, at 1491-92 (discussing Davis and "whipsaw" concept).
122. Id at 1492. For citations to contemporary bar studies regarding taxation under Davis, see
Asimow, supra note 108, at 66 n.4; Malman, supra note 120, at 386 n.1 16.
123. Treasury Statement on H.k 3475 Before House Ways and Means Committee (July 25, 1983),
reprinted in 4 Tax Mgmt. Primary Sources (BNA) 263 (1986). Objecting to Davis's harsh
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Congress intended to provide uniform tax treatment of property
settlements regardless of variations in state property laws, 24 to reflect the
policy that spouses are to be treated as a single economic unit,"2 to
reduce whipsaw to the government, 126 and to make the tax laws as
unintrusive as possible with respect to relations between spouses.2 7
Congress has also evidenced its intent concerning transfers of property
between spouses and former spouses through a number of other Code
provisions. The consistent theme of these provisions is that the
assignment doctrine should not apply to such transfers. 28 For example,
when installment obligations are sold, transferred, or otherwise disposed
of, the disposition normally triggers recognition of gain to the
transferor. 29 When installment obligations are transferred pursuant to
section 1041, however, no gain recognition is triggered, and the
transferee simply steps into the tax position of the transferor.' Similarly,
assignment of income principles codified by the grantor trust
provisions'' are inapplicable in the context of divorce. 3 2 Likewise,
transfers of IRAs pursuant to divorce or separation instruments are not
subject to assignment of income principles that usually require such
transfers to be treated as taxable distributions.' Additionally, Congress
rejected assignment principles in the divorce context when it enacted the
Retirement Equity Act (REA) in 1984,1 4 under which retirement
payments are taxable to a non-earning spouse receiving them if he or she
consequences; the tax disparities state property law yielded under Davis, and the whipsaw Davis
probably caused, the Treasury emphasized that § 1041 would be mandatory, posed no significant
threat of revenue loss, and would apply to all transfers of property incident to divorce. Id; see also
Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1041-IT(a) A-2 (1984) (§ 1041 applies to "any" transfer of property between
spouses or former spouses).
124. See H.R. Rep. No. 98-432, at 1491.
125. Id.
126. Id at 1491-92.
127. Id. at 1492.
128. See generally Asimow, supra note 108, at 100-04; Nunnallee, supra note 108, at 637-38.
129. I.R.C. § 453B(a) (1994).
130. I.R.C. § 453B(g).
131. See I.RC. §§ 673-77 (1994).
132. I.R.C. § 682(a) (1994) provides that in the case of alimony trusts, the recipient spouse will be
taxable on the trust income notwithstanding control or reversionary interests rctained by the grantor
spouse.
133. LR.C. § 408(d)(6) (1994).
134. Pub. L. No. 98-397, §§ 204-07, 98 Stat. 1445-50 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 26 U.S.C.).
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received an interest in the plan in a qualified domestic relations order.'35
Finally, section 1041 overrides the income-triggering depreciation
recapture rules of sections 1245 and 1250,136 and unless the transfer is in
trust, 37 section 1041 overrides the loan assumption gain rules, which
normally trigger income to the extent liabilities exceed basis.'38
B. Inapplicability of the Assignment Doctrine to Section 351 Transfers
Many commentators have suggested that section 351 provides a good
model for resolving the conflict between section 1041 and the
assignment of income doctrine. 139 Like section 1041, section 351
provides for nonrecognition of gain or loss in certain transfers of
property." Accordingly, like section 1041, section 351 directly conflicts
with the assignment doctrine when the property transferred is an interest
in uncollected income.
This conflict was resolved in Hempt Bros. v. United States."4' In
Hempt, a partnership transferred its accounts receivable to a controlled
corporation in exchange for stock pursuant to section 351. When the
corporation later collected the receivables, the partnership asserted that it
and not the corporation was the proper taxpayer, arguing that income
must be taxed to those who earn it. The court reasoned that in the
absence of section 351, the partnership would have been taxable on the
value of the stock at the time of transfer as consideration received for an
assignment of income.142 Taxing the partners on the value of this
consideration, however, would have in effect rendered section 351
135. 1.1C. §§ 401(a)(13XA)-(B), 4 14(p) (1994); see, e.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88-37-013 (June 7,
1988). It is arguable that because REA only applies to certain plans, Congress intended the
assignment doctrine to apply to all other items of deferred compensation transferred between spouses
or former spouses. However, it is also arguable that Congress's intent in enacting REA was simply to
reject the assignment doctrine in the specific context before it. See Asimow, supra note 108, at 104.
136. H.R Rep. No. 98-432, pt. 2, at 1492 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 697, 1134;
see also I.RC. §§ 1245 (b)(1), 1250(d)(1) (1994).
137. .LR.C. § 1041(e) (1994).
138. Compare Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1041-1T(d) (1984) and Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-15-026 (Jan. 2,
1996) with Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947).
139. See, e.g., Asimow, supra note 108, at 88-89; Hoffman & Orbach, supra note 108, at 602;
Hjorth, supra note 108, at 166 n.68; Nunnallee, supra note 108, at 630; Brown, supra note 108, at
261-62.
140. Section 351 provides that no gain or loss is recognized when property is transferred to a
controlled corporation solely in exchange for stock of the corporation. LR.C. § 351(a) (1994).
141. 490 F.2d 1172 (3d Cir. 1974); see also Rev. Rul. 80-198, 1980-2 C.B. 113 (confirming
inapplicability ofassignment doctrine to § 351 transfers absent tax evasion).
142. 490 F.2d at 1176-77.
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inapplicable to a transfer of property within its provisions. The court's
method of resolving this conflict was to ascertain a controlling
congressional mandate.43 The court concluded that Congress's mandate
in enacting section 351 was to facilitate the incorporation of ongoing
businesses.'" To effectuate this mandate, the court held that the
assignment doctrine did not apply to section 351 transfers. It held that the
partnership was not taxable on the consideration it received and that the
corporation, rather than the partnership, was taxable on the income from
the accounts receivable.'45
One commentator has suggested that because the theoretical reason for
nonrecognition under section 351 is continuity of interest, which is not
the reason for nonrecognition under section 1041, the assignment
doctrine should apply to section 1041.146 However, although
nonrecognition under section 1041 is not based on continuity of interest,
at least in the case of transfers incident to divorce, continuity of interest
is only one reason justifying non-application of the doctline. The Hempt
court's reasoning was not that continuity of interest alone justifies non-
application of the assignment doctrine to a nonrecognition provision, but
rather, that in determining whether the assignment doctrine should apply,
the foremost concern must be to preserve Congress's objectives in
enacting the provision. If applying the doctrine thwarts these objectives,
the doctrine should not be applied.
In another case involving a conflict between the assignment doctrine
and congressional policy, Rubin v. Commissioner,'47 the Second Circuit
disregarded the assignment doctrine to honor the policy recognizing a
corporation as a taxable entity distinct from its shareholders' 4 Given the
importance of this policy, the assignment doctrine was considered an
inappropriately blunt tool for dealing with potential tax avoidance issues:
Resort to "common law" doctrines of taxation ... may occasionally
be useful in connection with 'transactions heavily freighted with
tax motives' which cannot be satisfactorily handled in other ways
143. Idm at 1177.
144. Id
145. Id. Like § 1041, § 351 only defers taxation, as latent gain remains tsxable if the stock or
property later is sold. See id. at 1178.
146. Gabinet, supra note 108, at 24.
147. 429 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1970).
148. Id at 653.
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[citation omitted], but they have no place where, as here, there is a
statutory provision adequate to deal with the problem presented. 149
The Rubin court considered section 482 to be a better tool for dealing
with potential tax avoidance issues because it permits sensitivity to the
circumstances of each case, including the hardship of imposing tax
liability on income a taxpayer did not receive.15 Rubin suggests that if
section 1041 presents a potential for tax avoidance when income items
are transferred, statutory or judicial tools more sensitive than the
assignment doctrine should be used to remedy this problem. The Berger
court's use of the clear reflection of income rule on the facts of that case
offers one example of how other anti-tax-avoidance doctrines may be
used to curb potential abuse without resort to blanket application of the
assignment doctrine.'
C. Unfavorable Results ofApplying the Assignment Doctrine to
Section 1041 Transfers
Commentators have also argued that applying the assignment doctrine
to section 1041 does not serve the doctrine's purposes and may even
frustrate them.' 2 The doctrine's manifest purposes are to safeguard
progressivity and protect the tax base. Given the operation of the joint
return, however, transfers during marriage do not achieve tax reduction
as they once might have."' Similarly, transfers incident to divorce do not
present a substantial threat of tax avoidance, as they are characterized by
involuntariness, relinquishment of control over the economic benefits of
the income involved, and the improbability of frequent manipulation and
repetition by taxpayers."M Additionally, applying the assignment doctrine
at divorce magnifies the doctrine's anti-progressive preference for
149. Id.
150. Id. at 653-54.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 103-07. The Berger court's approach is consistent with
how courts have approached §351, which trumps the assignment doctrine but, in some
circumstances, may be trumped by the clear reflection of income rule. Berger v. Commissioner, 71
T.C.M. (CCH) 2160, 2178 (citing Palmer v. Commissioner 29 T.C. 154 (1957), aff'd, 267 F.2d 434
(9th Cir. 1959)).
152. See, e.g., Asimow, supra note 108, at 104-09; Nunnallee, supra note 108, at 636-41.
153. See I.RC. § 6013 (1994).
154. Because they share these characteristics, as well as an element of personal tragedy, divorce
transfers have been analogized to death transfers, to which the tax law refuses to apply the
assignment doctrine, even when the result is an obvious tax benefit. Nunnallee, supra note 108, at
644.
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investment income over earned income. 5 Couples whose assets consist
largely of investment property may easily shift future tax liability at
divorce by transferring the underlying property at divorce. If the
assignment doctrine overrides section 1041, however, couples whose
assets consist largely of deferred income items will be less able to shift
tax liability at divorce.
More importantly, as was the case in Hempt,":'6 applying the
assignment doctrine to section 1041 transfers thwarts Congress's
objectives in permitting nonrecognition for such transfers. Applying the
assignment doctrine in Kochansky illustrates why this is especially so in
the case of community property taxpayers. Had the assignment doctrine
been applied in the form that requires an assignor to be taxed on
consideration received in exchange for an income right, the court first
would have had to determine the extent of the community's interest in
the fee, because transfer only occurred to the extent that Ms. Kochansky
did not already possess a community property interest in the fee.
Mr. Kochansky would have been taxable at the time of divorce on the
consideration he received for transferring the interest in the fee that was
not already Ms. Kochansky's community property. At the time of
divorce, however, it would have been practically impossible to determine
the extent of the community interest in the fee, unless Mr. Kochansky
could have forecast the number of hours he would spend on the lawsuit
after divorce and the amount that would be collected. Next, it would have
been necessary for the court to determine which prcperty served as
consideration for the portion of the fee that was assigned. If this
consideration consisted of a relinquishment of marital rights, its value
would have been presumed to equal the value of the income right
assigned. 57 Valuation of the contingent fee at the time of divorce,
however, might have borne little or no relation to the amount ultimately
collected-especially if the claim yielded no recovery. Had the spouses
agreed that Mr. Kochansky would collect the entire fee, determining
Ms. Kochansky's tax liability would have presented similar difficulties;
in that case, Ms. Kochansky would have been taxable at divorce on
whatever consideration she received in exchange for her community
interest in the fee. It would thus have been necessary to determine the
extent of Ms. Kochansky's community interest in the fee, specify the
155. See Bittker, supra note 20, at 1403.
156. Hempt Bros. v. United States, 490 F.2d 1172 (3d Cir. 1974); see supra text accompanying
notes 141-46.
157. See supra note 112.
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consideration exchanged for this interest, and value that consideration as
of the time of divorce. In effect, this approach would have reinstated the
Davis rule and certainly would not have fostered the simple, consistent
form of divorce taxation Congress intended, as the Tax Court has
recognized.'58
Instead of applying this form of the assignment doctrine, the
Kochansky court purported to tax the assignor on the income when it was
ultimately collected by the assignee. In applying this form of the
assignment doctrine to community property taxpayers, however, the
Ninth Circuit was bound by Johnson. Applying the doctrine as Johnson
requires would also thwart section 1041's purposes. Such an approach
would have necessitated a preliminary determination of the community
interest in the fee because each spouse would have been taxable on that
portion of the fee representing his or her community property interest
regardless of who collected it. Because some portion of the fee was
earned after divorce, Ms. Kochansky's community interest necessarily
would have been less than half of the fee, and accordingly, she would
have been taxable on some amount less than she collected.
Alternatively, had the Kochanskys agreed that the entire fee would go
to Mr. Kochansky, the Service would have been entitled to tax
Ms. Kochansky on her community share when Mr. Kochansky
eventually collected. If Ms. Kochansky had transferred her community
interest merely for a relinquishment of Mr. Kochansky's marital rights,
she would have generated no cash with which to pay this unexpected tax
liability. Had she transferred her interest for other property, she would
have generated no cash to pay the tax liability until she sold the property,
at which time she would have incurred a second tax liability on any
latent gain. If the Kochanskys had agreed that Mr. Kochansky would pay
his former wife's community property tax liability on the fee when he
collected it, as the spouses in Johnson agreed, a determination of the
extent of the community's interest in the fee would still have been
necessary to determine Ms. Kochansky's tax liability on the fee. Such an
agreement would have yielded an anti-progressive result if
Ms. Kochansky's rate differed from Mr. Kochansky's. The Kochanskys
could also have agreed that Ms. Kochansky would reimburse
Mr. Kochansky for the taxes he paid if the Service determined he was
158. See supra text accompanying notes 91-92 and 99-102.
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taxable on the entire fee notwithstanding Johnson. This agreement also
would yield anti-progressive results if the spouses' rates differed.
59
Thus, applying the assignment of income doctrine as Johnson requires
does not achieve Congress's purposes in enacting sectiDn 1041. Unless
both spouses' counsel are particularly adept at tax calculations,"6
Johnson can easily impose a severe hardship on community property
spouses. Tax indemnification agreements can temper this hardship for
those who secure them, but such agreements can. produce anti-
progressive results. Furthermore, taxpayers who relinqui.sh a community
interest in their spouse's deferred earnings at divorce are unlikely to
voluntarily report income as their former spouse later collects.
Meanwhile, transferee spouses would be entitled to excliude that portion
of the income representing their former spouse's commmity interest.
When Congress expressed a desire to make the tax laws "as
unintrusive as possible with respect to relations between spouses," it had
in mind a broad, simple rule under which spouses could easily determine,
by the structure of their property settlement, who would bear the latent
tax burdens of the marital assets distributed at divorce, regardless of
variations in state property law.' Applying the assignment doctrine to
section 1041 increases the complexity of negotiations at divorce and the
potential for harsh results to taxpayers and whipsaw to the government.
V. APPLYING SECTION 1041 IN KOCHANSKY
Section 1041 governs all transfers of property between spouses, and
between former spouses if the transfer is incident to divorce 62 and
159. The Kochanskys in fact agreed that if Mr. Kochansky were taxable on the entire fee,
Ms. Kochansky would pay him an amount equal to the refund to which she would be entitled had
she not claimed the amount as income. Kochanasky v. Commissioner, 67 T.C.M. (CCH) 2665, 2666
(1994). The progressivity of this agreement, at least as far as Mr. Kochansky was concerned, also
would depend on whether his wife's rate differed from his own.
160. Additionally, if the property settlement must be fashioned by a ourt, it is unlikely to
perfectly account for future tax consequences. See generally Roland Hjorth, The Effect of Federal
Tax Consequences on Amount of Property Allocated to Spouses in State Court Dissolution
Proceedings, 24 Faro. L.Q. 247 (1990) (observing that generally state courts do not take federal tax
consequences into account when valuing assets at divorce).
161. H.R. Rep. No. 98-432, pt. 2, at 1492 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 697, 1134.
162. LR.C. § 1041(a) (1994). A transfer of property is incident to divorce if it occurs within one
year after the date on which the marriage ceases, or is related to the cessation of the marriage. LR.C.
§ 1041(c). A transfer of property is treated as related to the cessation of a marriage if the transfer is
pursuant to a divorce or separation instrument and occurs not more than six years after the date on
which the marriage ceases. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1041-IT(b) A-7 (1984).
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occurred after July 18, 1984.63 The Kochanskys were divorced on
July 23, 1985.' 64 Accordingly, section 1041 applied in Kochansky if an
interest in a contingent fee was "property" and if such property was
"transferred" between the Kochanskys.
Section 1041 offers no indication that an interest in a contingent fee
would not be considered property under its provisions. The section does
not define property, 65 and the regulations do not limit the term's
scope."6 Additionally, decisions in related contexts indicate that a
contingent fee interest is property for the purposes of section 1041. As
the Hempt court observed in concluding that accounts receivable are
property for the purposes of nonrecognition under section 351, the word
"property" generally has a broad reach in tax law. 67 Additionally, in a
decision prior to the enactment of section 1041, the Tax Court treated a
spouse's community interest in accounts receivable as property when she
transferred that interest at divorce. 68 The Tax Court has also held a
contingent fee interest to be property for estate tax purposes. 169 Finally,
courts in the community property states have concluded that contingent
fee interests are not only property, but property that may be divided or
transferred between spouses at divorce.170
The Kochanskys' property settlement operated to transfer this
property when the agreement was executed. The Tax Court has stated
that the usual connotations of the term "transfer" are to apply for the
163. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1041-11(t).
164. Kochansky, 67 T.C.M. (CCH) at 2666. Transfers pursuant to instruments in effect on or
before July 18, 1984, however, are not subject to § 1041 absent an election by the spouses. Temp.
Treas. Reg. § 1.1041-1T(f). The Tax Court's opinion implies that the property settlement was
executed at the time of the Kochanskys' divorce in 1985. In any case, the settlement could not have
been in effect on or before July 18, 1984, because it refers to the case number of a lawsuit filed on
October 19, 1984. Kochansky, 67 T.C.M. (CCH) at 2666.
165. One commentator has proposed that the definition of property for the purposes of § 1041
should be based on the existence of tax basis, even if that basis is zero, as is the case with service-
generated income rights such as contingent fee interests. See Gabinet, supra note 108, at 20, 25.
166. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1041-IT(a) A-4 (providing that § 1041 governs transfers of
property, whether real or personal, tangible or intangible).
167. Hempt Bros. v. United States, 490 F.2d 1172, 1175 (3d Cir. 1974) (citing E.I. DuPont de
Nemours v. United States, 471 F.2d 1211, 1218-19 (Ct. Cl. 1973)); see supra text accompanying
notes 141-45. An attorney's interest in a contingent fee has been denied treatment as property for the
purposes of securing capital gains preferences, see Wilkinson v. United States, 304 F.2d 469, 473-
75 (Ct. Cl. 1962), but an asset may be viewed as property although not as a capital asset, see Hempt,
490 F.2d at 1175; see also Asimow, supra note 108, at 109 n.198.
168. Showalter v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 192 (1974).
169. Estate of Curry v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 540 (1980).
170. See cases cited supra note 75.
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purposes of section 1041.' Under this view, the Tax Court held that a
valid settlement dividing community property interests operated to
transfer property as of the date of the settlement, even though the divorce
was not finalized until six months later. 72 The Tax Cort has also stated
that in determining when transfer occurs for the purposes of section
1041, all the surrounding circumstances are relevant but generally
transfer is complete upon the earlier of the passage of legal title or the
passage of equitable title. 73 This view also yielded a determination that a
section 1041 transfer occurred upon the execution of a property
settlement. 74
In Friscone v. Commissioner,' the Tax Court considered a property
settlement which, like the Kochanskys' settlement, did not speak of legal
title, but rather, awarded each spouse a percentage of fiuture income. In
Friscone, the settlement awarded each spouse a portion of the proceeds
from the sale of certain stock176 and provided that each spouse would
bear tax liability on his or her share of these proceeds.177 The court held
that the settlement operated to transfer the stock and that the spouse to
whom it was transferred was taxable on the proceeds with reference to a
carryover basis under section 1041. The court reasoned that although the
settlement did not pass legal title to the stock, it transferred equitable title
by granting the right to share in the sale proceeds and imposing a
contractual duty to share in the corresponding tax liability. 78 The
Kochanskys' settlement similarly provided that each spouse would be
entitled to a certain share of the proceeds of the contingent fee and that
171. Harrington v. Commissioner, 67 T.C.M. (CCH) 3060,3061 (1994).
172. Id. at3061.
173. Berger v. Commissioner, 71 T.C.M. (CCH) 2160, 2173-75 (1996). Equitable title passes
when the benefits and burdens of ownership shift. Id.
174. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 103-07. Cf. Godlewski v. Commissioner, 90 T.C.
200 (1988) (holding that transfer of legal title by deed accomplished transfer before property
agreement was finalized until five days later).
175. 71 T.C.M. (CCH) 2837 (1996).
176. Id. at 2838. Friscone involved a stock redemption in a close corporation according to the
terms of a divorce decree. Such redemptions have engendered much contrcversy on the issue of
whether the stock has been transferred to a third party "on behalf of' a spouse for the purposes of
§ 1041. See supra text accompanying note 96-97; Ames v. United States, 981 F.2d 456 (9th Cir.
1992); Praegitzer v. Commissioner, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2018 (1997); Blatt v. Commissioner, 102 T.C.
77 (1994); Hayes v. Commissioner, 101 T.C. 593 (1993); see generally Thomas Monaghan, Note,
Corporate Redemption in the Context of Martial Dissolutions: LR.C. § 1041 and Ames v. United
States, 68 Wash. L. Rev. 923 (1993). In contrast to such cases, the transfer in Kochansky involved no
transfer of property to a third party.
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each would bear tax liability on his or her share of the proceeds.'79
Accordingly, even if the settlement did not transfer legal title to the
contingent fee, it passed equitable title and accomplished transfer under
the Tax Court's analysis in Friscone.'80
Of course, the Kochanskys' property settlement only transferred
property to the extent that Ms. Kochansky obtained an interest larger
than her existing community property interest in the fee. Even so,
determining each spouse's tax liability under this approach would have
been relatively simple. To the extent that the settlement transferred an
interest to Ms. Kochansky, she received this interest as a non-taxable gift
and took Mr. Kochansky's zero basis in it. Determining the extent of her
community property interest would have been unnecessary, because
Ms. Kochansky's basis in the community interest she already possessed
was also zero. Accordingly, she would have been taxable on the entire
amount that she collected, regardless of what proportion of the proceeds
were community property. Even if no portion of the contingent fee had
been community property, the tax results would have been identical, for
in that case, Ms. Kochansky would have taken Mr. Kochansky's zero
basis in the entire interest transferred to her at divorce. In either case,
Mr. Kochansky would have been taxable only upon the proceeds from
the interest that he retained, and neither spouse would have been taxable
on money the other actually received.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Kochansky v. Commissioner, the Ninth Circuit applied the
assignment of income doctrine in contravention of established principles
of community property taxation, including principles established by the
Ninth Circuit in Johnson v. United States. Had the Ninth Circuit applied
the assignment doctrine in the manner Johnson requires, however, the tax
consequences of divorce to community property taxpayers would have
179. Kochansky v. Commissioner, 67 T.C.M. (CCH) 2665,2666 (1994).
180. Because the contingent fee proceeds, after passing to an escrow company, passed through
Mr. Kochansky's trust account in the process of reaching Ms. Kochansky, it is arguable that a
transfer governed by § 1041 occurred when Mr. Kochansky disbursed Ms. Kochansky's share to her,
rather than through the operation of the Kochanskys' property settlement. Under this view, that
portion of the proceeds which was not already Ms. Kochansky's community property would be
treated as a non-taxable gift to her under § 1041. However, to the extent that the proceeds were her
community property, no transfer could have occurred, as she already owned them. To this extent,
M. Kochansky would have remained taxable on them. Thus, not only does this view not accord with
Friscone, it necessitates a complicated determination of community property interests in the fee at
the time of divorce.
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been unnecessarily complex and potentially harsh. Instead of applying
the assignment of income doctrine at all, the Kochansky court should
have applied section 1041 of the Internal Revenue Code. Such an
approach would have harmonized treatment of section 1041 with other
Code provisions related to divorce and with the nonrecognition
provisions of section 351. More importantly, this approach would have
provided a fair, simple, and uniform rule for taxpayers trying to structure
an equitable division of their property at divorce.
